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ABSTRACT  
Value and salience are key variables for associative learning, decision-making, and attention. 
In this chapter we review definitions of value and salience, and describe human neuroimaging 
studies that dissociate these variables. Value increases with the magnitude and probability of 
reward but decreases with the magnitude and probability of punishment, whereas salience 
increases with the magnitude and probability of both reward and punishment. Moreover, 
salience may be particularly enhanced in situations with probabilistic as opposed to safe 
outcomes. At the behavioral level, both value and salience independently accelerate behavior. 
At the neural level, value signals arise in striatum, orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, and superior parietal areas, whereas magnitude-based salience signals arise in the 
anterior cingulate cortex and the inferior parietal cortex. By contrast, probability-based 
salience signals have been found in ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In conclusion, the related 
nature of value and salience stresses the importance of disentangling both variables 
experimentally. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most adaptive functions for humans and animals is the ability to predict future 
outcomes. This ability allows us to prepare and execute appropriate actions to obtain rewards 
and avoid punishments. For example, the sight of fruits hanging from a tree allows us to 
approach the tree and harvest the fruits. Similarly, if we have learned about the likely 
consequences of this stimulus, the sight of a leopard in a tree allows for avoidance behavior. 
In other words, the appropriate use of information provided by predictive stimuli allows for 
survival-promoting, adaptive behavior. Such behavior is also beneficial in evolutionary terms, 
by providing an advantage over other members of the species who have learned the meaning 
of the stimuli less well, and who as a consequence get to eat less fruit and are more likely to 
fall prey to a leopard [1]. 
 
A hallmark of adaptive behavior is that it relates stimuli in a meaningful way to their 
predicted outcomes. In particular, the magnitude of the predicted outcome is an important 
factor that influences behavior. For example, the sight of many fruits on a tree signals more 
reward and may increase the probability of approach compared to the sight of fewer fruits. 
Similarly, an adult leopard may be avoided more resolutely than a baby leopard. Despite the 
different responses they elicit, both the tree with plenty of fruits and the adult leopard will 
capture more attention and cognitive resources than the tree with just a few fruits and the baby 
leopard. Increased attention in turn will reduce the latency of approach and avoidance 
responses. These orderly relations between stimuli and predicted outcomes can be captured by 
two theoretical concepts: value and salience. Roughly speaking, value guides appropriate 
action selection in a magnitude-dependent fashion, whereas salience captures attention 
according to the overall importance of the stimulus.  
 
Value arises from the intrinsic meaning of two different types of predicted outcomes: rewards 
and punishments. Rewards have positive value and are approached, whereas punishments 
have negative value and are avoided. Thus, value is a signed currency that varies in a 
monotonic fashion from negative to positive. In contrast, salience is an unsigned currency, 
and the more negative or the more positive the predicted outcome, the more salient it is and 
the more attention it will draw. Thus, in the scheme proposed here, salience relates to value 
such that the absolute value of the predicted outcome determines its salience, irrespective of 
whether the predicted outcome is a reward or a punishment [2,3]. For example, if the absolute 
value of a banana is the same as the absolute value of an intimidating display of a conspecific, 
then the two have equal salience. The fact that the definitions of value and salience are related 
to each other may explain why the literature has not always separated them in empirical 
studies [4,5]. 
 
The predictive relations between stimuli and outcomes have to be learned from experience. It 
should therefore come as no surprise that learning theory has much to say about predicted 
value and salience [6-8]. In particular, associative learning theory describes the mechanisms 
with which predictive stimuli become valuable [9] and salient [10-12]. Moreover, learning 
theory has provided several, not mutually exclusive, definitions of salience and suggested 
ways in which they could be combined [13].  
 
This chapter reviews how value and salience are defined by learning theory, how they can be 
distinguished from each other experimentally, and how they are processed in the human brain 
to mediate adaptive behavior. Importantly, we focus on predictive (learned) value and 
salience rather than on experienced (outcome-related) value and salience [e.g., 14]. Moreover, 
this chapter only discusses human studies, and the reader is referred to different chapters of 
this book covering the neural processing of value and salience in animals (see chapters 2-5) 
[see also 15]. 
 
2. VALUE 
2.1. DEFINITION AND BEHAVIORAL FUNCTION 
Value has been defined in many different ways and is an important concept for various 
scientific disciplines such as psychology, economics, and ecology. The importance of the 
concept arises from its various functions. Value guides choice behavior [16]. In particular, 
stimuli with positive value elicit approach, whereas stimuli with negative value elicit 
avoidance behavior. In addition to guiding decisions, value constituting rewards and 
punishments also elicit associative learning [9] and are associated with emotions, including 
pleasure and pain [17]. Here we consider learned value, that is, the value that a previously 
neutral stimulus has acquired through association with a reward or punishment. The 
computational and neural processes by which predictive stimuli acquire value through 
associative learning are discussed in different chapters of this book.  
 
At the most general level, value can be defined as the capacity of a stimulus or goal to elicit 
effort exertion. We exert energy (i.e. work) to obtain stimuli with positive value and to avoid 
stimuli with negative value. In addition, we work harder with more highly valued stimuli than 
with less highly valued stimuli. Experimenters can harness the monotonic relationship 
between behavior and predicted outcomes, and infer the value of the outcome by the strength, 
latency, or probability of the response elicited by the outcome predictive stimulus (i.e., the 
conditioned response). For example, stimuli predictive of larger or more likely rewards elicit 
stronger approach behavior in rats (e.g., as measured by their running speed down an alley) 
than stimuli predictive of smaller or less likely rewards [18]. Accordingly, experimenters can 
take the running speed elicited by the different predictive stimuli as a proxy for value.  
 
Work or energy exertion in the above definition is meant in a broad sense and not restricted to 
specific types of learned actions. Still, it applies most naturally to instrumental conditioning, 
i.e. situations in which delivery of the outcome depends on whether a specific response is 
performed [8]. Nevertheless, also with Pavlovian conditioning, i.e. in situations in which the 
delivery of the outcome is independent of any response production, conditioned responses 
occur and scale with value. For example, dogs salivate more to stimuli that predict more meat 
powder [7], and thus, Pavlovian responses can also be taken as a proxy for value. 
 
In the definition above, value is a subjective variable that has to be inferred from how 
individuals respond to stimuli. However, value directly relates to objective parameters that 
can be controlled experimentally. For instance, value increases with increasing reward 
magnitude and decreases with increasing punishment magnitude (Fig. 1A). Thus, a stimulus 
predicting two cherries is more valuable than a stimulus predicting one cherry. Similarly, 
value increases with increasing probability of reward and decreases with increasing 
probability of punishment (Fig. 1B). Accordingly, a stimulus predicting a cherry with 100% is 
more valuable than a stimulus predicting a cherry with 50%, which in turn is more valuable 
than a stimulus predicting a cherry with 0%. For simplicity, Figure 1 depicts value as a linear 
function of magnitude and probability but empirically, this relation is often found to be non-
linear, at least for large magnitudes and probabilities close to 0 and 1 [16]. 
 
--- Figure 1 --- 
 The value functions depicted in Figure 1 span the whole range of reward and punishments. 
This implies that a true value signal not only distinguishes rewards and punishments 
according to their positive versus negative valence but that a difference of two value units in 
the punishment domain is represented similarly to a difference of two units in the reward 
domain. Such value coding on a common scale is a requirement for making computations 
across the entire range of possible values and allows us to determine the integrated value of 
stimuli predicting mixed outcomes (i.e., losses and gains, rewards and punishments, or costs 
and benefits). 
 
The definition of value as a function of magnitude and probability has been taken up in 
various economic theories suggesting different ways in which probability and magnitude 
should be, or are, combined during choice (expected value, expected utility, prospect; [for 
review 19]). For instance, by multiplying the magnitude of an outcome by the probability with 
which it occurs, the two variables are integrated to form the expected value. In neoclassical 
economic theory [e.g., 20], value (or utility) has become a placeholder that can capture overt 
choice behavior (revealed preferences) if that behavior obeys a set of basic principles 
(axioms, such as transitivity: if one prefers A over B and B over C then one ought to prefer A 
over C). In other words, as long as choice behavior follows these principles, it can be 
described as if decision makers maximize a hypothetical value function. Although research in 
behavioral economics, psychology, and neuroscience has repeatedly found empirical 
deviations from this normative neoclassical ideal [e.g., 16], these deviations do not contradict 
the basic notion that value is a function of magnitude and probability. 
 
Reinforcement learning theory also recognizes that the value of the predicted outcome 
increases with magnitude and probability of occurrence. Accordingly, the strength of the 
predictive response increases with magnitude and probability. Value learning corresponds to 
the gradual adjustment of predictions until the predicted value reflects the experienced value 
[for review 21]. At the end of each trial [9], or at each moment in time [22], the organism is 
thought to compute a prediction error that corresponds to the value difference between the 
actual outcome (or state) and the predicted outcome (or state). The prediction error is used to 
update the previous prediction in order to generate a more accurate prediction. The ultimate 
goal is to adjust the predictions such that they are proportional to the value of the outcome, 
both for magnitude and probability. Thus, at the end of learning, value predictions correspond 
to the value functions depicted in Figure 1. 
 
So far we have considered one single type of value learning for a single use, namely stimulus-
outcome learning for the prediction of rewards and punishments. However, it is likely that 
independent valuation systems can be employed in parallel that are differentially suited to 
handle variable versus stable environments. For example, a goal-directed learning system may 
be based on a mental model of the world, and represent the long-term value of outcomes 
resulting from a number of different future actions and states. Alternatively, a habitual 
learning system may represent experience-based value predictions of the immediate state 
without the need of a model. In other words, different value systems may use different 
mechanisms to learn different value predictions and to support habitual or goal-directed 
behavior [23]. 
 
 
2.2. VALUE SIGNALS IN THE HUMAN BRAIN 
Functional neuroimaging has revealed predicted outcome magnitude and probability signals 
in the human striatum and midbrain, consistent with results from studies using single cell 
recordings [24]. The striatal signals are reminiscent of the responses emitted by single 
dopamine neurons which increase firing with both predicted reward magnitude and 
probability [25,26]. In one human neuroimaging study [27], subjects learned the meaning of 
visual stimuli that were graded in two dimensions: color (between light yellow and dark red) 
and shape (between one and five circles). One dimension was associated with gradations in 
reward magnitude, and the other with gradations in probability (across subjects, the dimension 
to probability or magnitude assignment and the increasing/decreasing direction of the 
dimensions was counterbalanced). FMRI data were acquired after learning was completed. In 
each trial, one stimulus was shown and subjects indicated with a button press where on the 
screen it was displayed. Stimulus-induced activations in the striatum increased with 
probability, magnitude, and their combination. Similar magnitude- and probability-related 
striatal activations have been reported for a variety of tasks [28-44]. For instance with 
magnitude, striatal activity integrates punishment and reward value in response to stimuli 
predicting mixed outcomes [45]. 
 
While the fMRI studies cited above support the notion that a single decision variable 
capturing both probability and magnitude is encoded in these areas, some studies have shown 
spatial decomposition of probability and magnitude information within the striatum 
[27,32,41]. In one example, Yacubian and colleagues asked subjects to place a bet of one of 
two magnitudes (either €1.00 or €5.00) on gambles involving a winning probability of either 
12.5% or 50% [41]. Activity was analyzed during an anticipatory period, before the outcome 
was revealed. Probability-related activations arose in more anterior and lateral regions of the 
ventral striatum, whereas magnitude-related activations arose in more posterior and medial 
regions (Fig. 2). Despite this segregation, it should be kept in mind that magnitude- and 
probability-related activations overlap substantially in large areas of the striatum, as would be 
expected from a value-coding region. 
 
--- Figure 2 --- 
 
Moreover, fMRI activations related to the magnitude or probability of expected outcomes 
have also been reported in cortical regions, including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) [14,31], 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) [3,45], superior frontal [31], lateral prefrontal (LPFC) [27,46-
48], as well as medial (MPFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) [37,38,42,46,48-
50]. The responses in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) to rewards as well as to reward-predictive 
stimuli represent high versus low reward magnitude information in distributed patterns 
[51,51]. Thus, even though electrophysiological recordings in animals report heterogeneous 
signals in prefrontal regions, such that the firing rate of different value-coding neurons 
increases and decreases with magnitude [52], neuroimaging methods can nevertheless be used 
to study the representation of magnitude in such regions. Moreover, human OFC responses 
represent the value of rewards and punishments on a common monotonic scale [3], which 
enables computations across the entire value range. Common or combined coding of both 
components has been observed in ACC for error magnitude and probability [53], in medial 
OFC [31,54] and in LPFC for reward magnitude and probability [27]. By contrast, 
preferential activations to probability, rather than magnitude, arise in parts of the MPFC [37]. 
 
Different brain regions have been suggested to code value in the context of model-based 
(goal-directed) and model-free (habitual) behavior [55,56]. Specifically, a dissociation of 
these different value signals has been shown within the striatum, with activity in the caudate 
nucleus coding for model-based, and in the putamen for model-free value signals [56]. 
However, both regions are functionally connected to the VMPFC, where they can be 
integrated to support value-based choice. This is in line with a large number of human 
neuroimaging studies reporting value-related activity in the VMPFC during value-based 
choice [57-66]. 
 
Moreover, recent evidence suggests that different regions in the ventral PFC are involved in 
coding the general vs. specific value of predicted outcomes. General value signals are 
independent of the specific nature of the reward (e.g., cherries or elderberries) and can be 
used to compare and choose between alternative outcomes, but are unable to inform 
expectations about the specific identity of the outcome. In contrast, identity-specific 
representations conjointly represent information about both value (how good is it?) and 
outcome identity (what is it?). Human imaging work has linked activity in the VMPFC to 
general value signals, which can be used to compare different expected outcomes on a 
common scale [59,67-70]. In contrast, activity in the OFC has been shown to code for specific 
rewards [71,72], and neural value codes for different reward categories differ in this region 
[69]. 
 
In line with the fact that the medial and lateral OFC belong to largely separate networks 
[73,74], the central and lateral OFC represent the value of future rewards in the form of 
identity-specific value codes, whereas value representations in medial areas generalize across 
different outcome-identities [68,75,76]. Such a dual representation of general and specific 
values in the PFC may allow for different forms of reward-related behaviors. Specifically, 
individuals may use general values to compare different options and to exert simple behaviors 
such as approach and avoidance responses. On the other hand, identity-specific values may 
support choices in line with the current needs of the organism, allow for outcome-specific 
responding, and enable the organism to flexibly update value predictions according to changes 
in the environment.  
 
3. SALIENCE 
3.1. DEFINITION AND BEHAVIORAL FUNCTION 
At the most general level, salience can be defined as the capacity of a stimulus to direct 
attention. However, salience is an ill-defined concept in cognitive neuroscience. Part of the 
confusion lies in that different researchers have used the same term to refer to different ideas 
of what makes a stimulus salient. For instance, in visual neuroscience, the term is used to 
describe the perceptual salience (often saliency) of a stimulus, that is, its physical properties 
(i.e., the color, contrast, orientation, or luminance) that make it more likely to capture 
attention [77,78]. On the other hand, the field of associative learning and value-based decision 
making uses the term to describe the acquired salience of a stimulus, that is, the importance 
that a stimulus has acquired through association with an incentive outcome. Perceptual 
salience is not a topic of this chapter and instead, we will only focus on acquired salience, and 
define it as a function of the value of the stimulus. 
 
More specifically, in line with associative learning theories, we define salience as the absolute 
(i.e., unsigned) value predicted by a stimulus (Fig. 1a). In other words, both rewarding and 
punishing outcomes are salient, and the degree of salience is determined by the value of the 
predicted outcome [2,3]. Without loss aversion [16], a stimulus predicting the receipt of one 
cherry has the same salience as a stimulus predicting the loss of one cherry. As such, salience 
relates to the importance of a stimulus for motivated behavior independent of its valence. The 
key behavioral function is therefore to guide attention to stimuli that predict motivationally 
relevant outcomes in order to facilitate neural processes related to planning and executing 
appropriate responses. 
 
The definition of salience is straightforward for deterministic outcomes, where outcomes are 
predicted with no uncertainty. In the case of probabilistic stimuli, however, the definition of 
salience is more complicated. Specifically, probability affects salience not only by changing 
value (see above). In fact, the attention-capturing properties of a stimulus have historically 
been described as associability, a concept that is closely related to salience and is meant to 
describe how well associations can be formed with a stimulus. A key determinant of 
associability is the predictability of a stimulus, that is, the probability with which a stimulus 
predicts an outcome. Different mechanisms have been suggested to describe the relationship 
between predictability, uncertainty, and associability [10,12]. Specifically, the Mackintosh 
model [10] states that reliable predictors of outcomes (close to 100%) will acquire higher 
salience and consequently capture more attention than poor predictors (close to 0%), which 
have a low level of salience and will consequently be ignored (Fig. 1B). In contrast, the 
Pearce-Hall model [12] posits that a high level of salience (and thus attention) should be 
applied to unreliable predictors of outcomes such that learning of these is enhanced. In other 
words, unreliable predictors (50%) are assumed to have higher salience than reliable 
predictors (close to 0% and 100%, Fig. 1B). 
 
The models of Mackintosh, and Pearce and Hall have recently been combined by a third 
model of attention in associative learning [13]. The Esber-Haselgrove model [13] assumes 
that (1) stimuli acquire salience to the degree that they predict incentive outcomes (similar to 
Mackintosh), (2) that both the occurrence and non-occurrence of an incentive outcome are 
salient events that are both partially predicted by a non-deterministic stimulus, and (3) that 
salience is defined as the sum of the absolute values of all possible outcomes (occurrence and 
non-occurrence of positive and negative outcomes) associated with a stimulus. Based on these 
assumptions, this model predicts that both high (100%) and low probability cues (0%) have a 
lower salience than intermediate predictors of outcomes (e.g., 50%), and that good predictors 
(100%) have a generally higher salience than poor predictors (0%) [79]. In other words, the 
Esber-Haselgrove model predicts a skewed, inverted u-shaped relationship between 
probability and salience (Fig. 1B).  
 
Of note, defining salience as the sum of all (positive and negative) outcomes predicted by a 
stimulus is a fundamental idea, which can also be applied to deterministic predictors of 
outcomes. Specifically, in the case of compound stimuli, predicting multiple deterministic (or 
probabilistic) outcomes, salience can be defined as the absolute value of the average predicted 
outcome (global salience): a stimulus predicting both the receipt of one cherry and the loss of 
one cherry would have a global salience of zero. Alternatively, salience can be defined as the 
sum of the absolute values of the individual predicted outcomes (elemental salience, Fig. 3C): 
a stimulus predicting both the receipt of one cherry and the loss of one cherry would have an 
elemental salience corresponding to two cherries. Supporting the fundamental assumption of 
the Esber-Haselgrove model, we recently found [45] that the positive and negative outcomes 
predicted by individual stimuli contribute independently to the salience of the compound 
stimulus (Fig. 3D). Specifically, elemental salience predicted the latency of value-based 
responses and did so significantly better than global salience. 
 
--- Figure 3 --- 
 
3.2. CONFOUNDS IN OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF SALIENCE 
In order to test for behavioral and neural effects of salience, operational definitions of salience 
are required. From the paragraphs above, it should have become clear that the definition of 
salience is not as straightforward as intuitively assumed. Moreover, in many cases, salience is 
confounded by value, magnitude, or probability [80]. Specifically, in most studies using only 
rewards or only punishments as outcomes, value and salience are perfectly correlated (Fig. 1). 
Accordingly, neural signals that increase with reward magnitude could be related to value or 
salience [3,81]. This is especially true if neural responses to value and salience are 
heterogeneous, i.e., if the activity of different neuronal populations increases and decreases 
with increasing value [52]. Thus, if value is defined by different levels of outcome magnitude, 
experimental designs need to include both appetitive and aversive outcomes in order to 
dissociate value and salience. 
 
Similarly, when varying salience as a function of value operationalized by increases in 
probability, salience is likely to be confounded by probability and/or risk. As can be seen in 
Figure 1B, in order to dissociate salience as defined in the Esber-Haselgrove model (see 
Figure 1 and section 3.1 for a description of the model) from coding of value and risk (i.e., 
salience as defined in the Pearce-Hall model) experimental designs need to vary probability in 
multiple steps from 0% to 100%. The critical comparison is the one between 100% and 0% 
cues, which have the same risk, but different levels of salience [79]. At the same time, 
however, in order to control for the different value of these cues, intermediate levels of 
probability, which have lower value but higher salience, need to be tested. Alternatively, in 
order to dissociate salience as defined in the Mackintosh model from value and risk, 
experimental designs need to cover multiple steps of probability from 0% to 100% and must 
include both positive and negative outcomes. Here, value increases and decreases with the 
probability of positive and negative outcomes, respectively, whereas salience increases with 
the probability of both appetitive and aversive outcomes.  
 
Importantly, while it is theoretically possible to define salience in terms of absolute value 
based on magnitude, probability or both (expected value), it is not clear whether these 
different operationalizations are computationally equivalent. Also, while both have been 
shown to correlate with response times, and thus appear to facilitate behavior and neural 
processing [3,45,79,82], it is unclear whether they are processed in the same brain regions, 
and whether they subserve the same behavioral functions.  
 
3.3. SALIENCE SIGNALS IN THE HUMAN BRAIN 
Given the numerous potential confounds of salience described above, experimental 
investigations of salience can be challenging. Accordingly, only relatively few imaging 
studies have comprehensively addressed how value vs. salience are coded in the human brain. 
For instance, one study [82] used a simple value-based choice task involving images of snack 
items to dissociate value from salience. Specifically, subjects were asked to make a binding 
decision about whether or not they wanted to eat the currently displayed food item by 
choosing “Strong No”, “No”, “Yes”, or “Strong Yes”. Thus, by choosing “Yes”, they could 
obtain rewards, whereas by choosing “No” they could avoid punishments. The choices were 
used to determine the value of the items by assigning –2, -1, +1 and +2 to the four answers, 
respectively. In line with the above magnitude-based definition, salience was defined as 
absolute value. The study identified several brain regions in which fMRI activity was 
correlated with salience, including the ACC extending to supplemental motor area, the 
precentral gyrus, the insula, and the fusiform gyrus. In contrast, correlations with value were 
found in the VMPFC extending into MPFC, in the precuneus, and in the ventral striatum.  
 
A general problem of experiments involving choices is that aversive outcomes can be 
avoided. Specifically, the possibility of avoiding potential harm is likely to change the value 
associated with them [50]. Accordingly, it is unclear whether value and salience signals 
identified in studies involving choices reflect the same processes as in Pavlovian tasks, where 
outcomes cannot be avoided. Moreover, decisions about stimuli with low absolute values are 
intrinsically more difficult because the values are closer to indifference than choices involving 
high absolute values, and salience signals in choice paradigms are therefore correlated with 
difficulty and nonspecifically enhanced processing. Finally, anticipatory outcome signals 
related to value and salience are related to neural processing of action selection and choice 
execution, preventing a straightforward interpretation of these signals.  
 
In order to clearly dissociate neural representations of value and salience, we recently used a 
non-instrumental task, involving low and high magnitude monetary rewards and punishments 
[3]. Besides dissociating value and salience, this task controlled for several additional 
confounds. First, because of the non-instrumental nature of the task, aversive outcomes could 
not be avoided, thus maintaining the salience and value of the aversive stimuli, and at the 
same time preventing choice-related confounds. Second, we used abstract visual stimuli and 
associated them with rewarding (+0.5 or +5 Euros) and punishing (-0.5 or -5 Euros) outcomes 
using classical conditioning (Fig. 4A). This controlled for preexisting associations of the 
stimuli, and thus ensured approximately equal value of the outcomes across subjects. 
Furthermore, instead of using univariate fMRI data analysis, we used multivoxel pattern 
analysis (MVPA) techniques [83,84], which are sensitive to distributed representations.  
 
Our results revealed that fMRI activity patterns in the OFC, which had been assumed to be 
related to value [51,69] indeed represent value, and not salience (Fig. 4C). Moreover, also 
activity patterns in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) were related to value (Fig. 4D), which is 
noteworthy because previously reported value signals in the IPS [85-87] had been re-
interpreted as salience signals [81]. Thus, in the OFC and the posterior parietal cortex, 
distributed signals decreased with the magnitude of predicted punishments and increased with 
the magnitude of predicted rewards, reflecting a value signal. In contrast, we found salience 
signals in the ACC (Fig. 4E) and the inferior parietal cortex, extending into the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Fig. 4D). Salience signals also emerged in more superior 
regions of the parietal cortex, overlapping with neural representations of value in the IPS (Fig. 
4D). These results demonstrate that value and salience can be processed in the very same 
brain region, highlighting the importance of experimentally dissociating both variables. 
 
--- Figure 4 --- 
 
Taken together, the results from this study using deterministic outcome magnitude to vary 
salience identified a network including the ACC and the TPJ that is involved in salience 
processing. Interestingly, the TPJ has been suggested to be part of a ventral attention network 
that is involved in mediating orienting responses toward behaviorally relevant stimuli [88,89]. 
Paralleling results from studies on acquired salience discussed above, experiments found that 
the TPJ responds to behaviorally relevant stimuli [90], even if these stimuli are of low visual 
salience or unattended [91]. 
 
Our earlier study [45] converged with the subsequent one by showing salience signals in the 
TPJ. Specifically, similar to response times, fMRI signals in the TPJ were best explained by 
the summed salience of all positive and negative outcomes associated with the individual cues 
in the compound (Fig. 3E). Moreover, functional connectivity analyses suggested that 
salience signals in the TPJ were functionally linked to activity in the locus coeruleus (LC, Fig. 
3G), a noradrenergic nucleus in the brainstem [45]. This finding is in line with the hypothesis 
that the TPJ’s role in redirecting attention is supported by the activity of noradrenergic 
neurons in the LC [89], which directly innervate the superior temporal gyrus and inferior 
parietal cortex [92,93]. Noradrenaline has long been implicated in arousal and attention-
related increases in behavioral performance. In particular, noradrenergic neurons in the LC 
respond to target cues with phasic activity increases [94], and the magnitude of this response 
is correlated with measures of task performance [95]. These findings contrast with striatal 
value signals that are presumably related to midbrain dopamine (Fig. 3F).  
 
A few studies have investigated brain signals that correlate with salience, defined as a 
function of probability rather than magnitude. For instance, using an associative learning task 
with positive and negative outcomes (appetitive juice, money, salt water, and aversive 
pictures), one study showed that during learning activity in the VMPFC was correlated with 
the salience of stimuli that predicted positive and negative outcomes with 50% contingency 
[96]. Because activity for stimuli predicting positive and negative outcomes had the same 
sign, and thus cannot be explained by value (Fig. 1B), this finding suggests that VMPFC 
activity correlates with the acquired salience of predicted outcomes (Fig. 5). However, even 
though this design controlled well for value, it only included stimuli that predicted the 
outcome with 50% contingency, and thus, it is unclear whether the observed VMPFC signals 
reflect salience or risk. Nevertheless, a similar finding of salience in the VMPFC has been 
reported in a study that operationalized salience as 80% vs. 20% probability of reward or 
punishment [97]. Thus, levels of salience were independent of risk. Moreover, the same study 
reported a correlation between value (defined as the product of probability and valence and 
thus independent of salience) and fMRI activity in the central OFC, close to where value 
signals (defined as magnitude) have recently been reported [3].  
 
--- Figure 5 --- 
 
Taken together, these studies suggest a role for the VMPFC in salience processing, 
operationalized using probability. Supporting this idea, the firing patterns of neurons in the 
animal OFC, a region closely related to the human VMPFC, have shown to be explained by 
salience as defined by the Esber-Haselgrove model [79]. By contrast, studies using the 
magnitude of positive and negative outcomes reliably identified the ACC [82] and the TPJ 
[3,45], whereas VMPFC activity has not been linked to salience defined in this way [82]. 
Given these contrasting findings, it appears that salience operationalized as a function of 
probability and magnitude are differently processed in the human brain (Fig. 5C). In theory, 
probability- and magnitude-based salience could play differential roles for learning and 
behavior, respectively.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Value is a well understood concept that increases with magnitude and probability of reward 
and decreases with magnitude and probability of punishment, whereas salience has been less 
well defined. We show that by defining salience as absolute value, salience can be given a 
precise and quantifiable interpretation, both with respect to magnitude and probability. 
Defined in this way, salience increases with magnitude and probability of both reward and 
punishment. The close relation of value and salience implies that they can be separated 
experimentally only if both rewards and punishments are used. Human neuroimaging studies 
which followed this approach revealed value signals in the striatum, OFC and VMPFC, and 
PPC. Typically, magnitude- and probability-based value signals co-localize. By contrast, 
magnitude-based salience signals arose in TPJ and ACC, whereas probability-based salience 
signals were found in the VMPFC, suggesting different types of neural salience signals. 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
FIGURE 1. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF VALUE AND SALIENCE AS A FUNCTION OF 
MAGNITUDE AND PROBABILITY. A. Positive value, negative value, risk, and salience of 
deterministic predicted outcomes of different magnitudes (-1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1 in arbitrary units). 
B. Positive value, negative value, risk (salience according to the model by Pearce and Hall), 
salience according to the model by Mackintosh, and salience according to the model by Esber 
and Haselgrove of predicted outcomes (rewards and punishments) of different probabilities 
(0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%). Note, in B, Esber-Haselgrove salience is generated using 
the reduced model (assuming complete learning) with parameters from [79], resulting in a 
peak at 0.25; in A and B, risk is defined as variance, following the tradition of finance theory 
[19,98]. 
  
 FIGURE 2. SEGREGATED ENCODING OF PROBABILITY AND MAGNITUDE IN THE VENTRAL 
STRIATUM. A+B. Coronal and sagittal sections depicting magnitude and probability related 
fMRI activity (average of 98 subjects) in green and blue, respectively. Adapted from [41].  
  
 FIGURE 3. SALIENCE AND VALUE OF COMPOUND STIMULI. A-C. Trial structure and 
experimental stimuli. Subjects underwent classical conditioning with the single stimuli 
depicted in B. These stimuli were then combined into compound stimuli (depicted in C) that 
independently varied as a function of expected value (EV, i.e. value 1 + value 2), global 
salience (GS, absolute value of EV, i.e. |value 1 + value 2|), and elemental salience (ES, sum 
of absolute values of single stimuli, i.e. |value1| + |value 2|). D. Response times (RT) in the 
choice task were independently predicted by EV and ES, but did not correlate with GS. E. 
FMRI activity in the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) was best correlated with elemental 
salience. F. Double dissociation between value-related activity in the ventral striatum and 
salience-related activity in the TPJ. G. Functional connectivity between the TPJ and locus 
coeruleus (LC) was related to elemental salience. Adapted from [45]. 
  
 FIGURE 4. BRAIN REGIONS ENCODING VALUE AND SALIENCE. A-B. Design and conditions of 
the non-instrumental outcome prediction task. C-E. Regions in the OFC, IPS, TPJ, and ACC, 
in which activity patterns correlate with the value (yellow) and salience (pink) of Pavlovian 
stimuli predicting rewarding and punishing outcomes in different magnitudes. F. Value and 
salience signals from linear support vector regression models that were trained on multivoxel 
activity patterns to decode value and salience of the stimuli, respectively. IPS, intraparietal 
sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal 
cortex. Adapted from [3]. 
  
 FIGURE 5: PROBABILITY-BASED SALIENCE DURING LEARNING. A. Activity in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) correlates with the acquired probability-based 
salience (absolute predicted value) of different aversive and appetitive probabilistic (50%) 
outcomes during associative learning. B. Parameter estimates for low, middle, and high 
salience of different predicted outcomes (green, salty water; yellow, apple juice; red, aversive 
pictures; blue, money). Adapted from [96]. C. Brain regions representing probability- and 
magnitude-based salience are depicted in cyan and magenta, respectively. TPJ, 
temporoparietal junction; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; VMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. 
